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STANDARDS AS BARRIERS VERSUS
STANDARDS AS CATALYSTS:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF HACCP
IMPLEMENTATION ON U.S. SEAFOOD IMPORTS
SVEN M. ANDERS AND JULIE A. CASWELL
The United States mandated a Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) food safety standard
for seafood in 1997. Panel model results for 1990 to 2004 suggest that HACCP introduction had
a negative and significant impact on overall imports from the top thirty-three suppliers. While the
effect for developed countries was positive, the negative effect for developing countries supports
the view of “standards as barriers” versus “standards as catalysts.” A different perspective emerges
from individual country-level analysis. Regardless of development status, leading seafood exporters
generally experienced a positive HACCP effect, while most other smaller trading partners faced a
negative effect.
Key words: developed and developing countries, food standards, international trade.

As one of the world’s largest producers and
importers of fishery products, the issue of
seafood safety is of particular concern to the
United States. The risks associated with domestic and imported products motivated the
introduction of a mandatory Hazard Analysis
Critical Control Points (HACCP) approach to
food safety regulation in seafood processing in
1997.
In considering the effect of higher food
safety standards, such as HACCP, the conventional wisdom in the literature held that such
standards in developed countries amount to
“standards as barriers” to trade that are frequently used as protectionist tools that disadvantage developing countries. A more recent
and less pessimistic view emphasizes the opportunities provided by emerging food safety
standards and the possibility that developing
countries could use them to increase their competitive advantages. This “standards as catalysts” view argues that compliance with new
food standards may provide incentives for
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countries to modernize their export-oriented
sectors, as well as to strengthen the levels of
food and health standards at the national level.
We evaluate these two hypotheses by analyzing the impact of mandatory HACCP measures introduced in 1997 on imports to the
United States by the thirty-five largest seafood
exporting countries, of which twenty-six are
developing and nine developed countries. The
data set includes the pre-HACCP period 1990–
97 and the post-HACCP period 1998–2004. We
test the hypotheses by analyzing the overall
impact of HACCP adoption on U.S. seafood
imports and whether there was a differential
effect for developed and developing country
exporters over time. We then test for HACCP
trade effects at the individual country level, allowing for differential effects not categorized
by development status. Our results contribute
to the discussion of the impact of changing food
safety standards on the competitiveness of developing countries in international trade.
Food Safety and Trade: Empirical Evidence
There is a fairly extensive literature on the
general effects of food safety standards and
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) under the World Trade Organization
(WTO) on developing countries. For example,

Jaffee and Henson (2004) and the World Bank
(2005) argue that standards can act to impede
trade flows by explicit bans but more probably
through prohibitive costs of compliance, particularly for poorer countries. The investment
and recurrent “costs of compliance” to penetrate high-income markets could undermine
the competitive position of many developing
countries or narrow the profitability of highvalue food exports.
However, Jaffee and Henson (2004) and the
World Bank (2005) highlight potential opportunities arising from developments in standards. Certain countries may be able to use
the new standards environment to their competitive advantage and increase their market
shares in trade. This possibility depends on the
modernization of supply chain structures in
export-oriented industries in developing countries. Jaffee and Henson conclude that the simple black and white argument between food
safety “standards as barriers” and “standards
as catalysts” is more complex in reality. The
issue requires close analysis of the dynamics
of particular standards, markets, products, and
countries.
To date, only a few studies have used empirical data to estimate the impact of national and
international food safety regulations on trade
flows (Paarlberg and Lee 1998; Calvin and
Krissoff 1998; Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh
2001; Wilson and Otsuki 2004; Maskus, Otsuki,
and Wilson 2005; Peterson and Orden 2005).
A common result is that more stringent food
safety standards set by developed countries
tend to deter trade supporting the view of
“standards as barriers.” Overall, changes in
trade patterns related to standards take place
within the context of broader changes. For example, Carrere (2006) finds that the effects of
regional trade agreements on trade flows have
become quite powerful in explaining changing
patterns of food trade.
Seafood markets have attracted less attention even though seafood consumption
accounts for a disproportionate share of foodborne illnesses in the United States (U.S. GAO
2001) and other OECD countries (Cato and
Lima dos Santos 1998). Martı́nez-Zaroso and
Nowak-Lehmann (2004) explore the export
potential of MERCOSUR countries in a liberalized European Union (EU) market. Panel
model results suggest strong correlations between the overall level of EU market protectionism and the growth rate of MECOSUR
exports. In particular, the authors found the
category of fishery products faced high barriers to trade from EU protection.

Debaere (2005) empirically investigates the
impact of changing trade policies, in particular
the EU zero tolerance policy for antibiotics, on
the global shrimp market. He shows that the
EU policy, mainly the loss of Thailand’s preferential status in the EU, enforced differences
in international safety standards leading to a
disruption of trade flows from Europe toward
the United States. This led to a significant decrease in U.S. shrimp prices and caused a U.S.
antidumping case against six Asian shrimp exporting countries. Finally, Peridy, Guillotreau,
and Bernard (2000) apply a panel model to
analyze the economic factors affecting seafood
imports into France. However, the influence of
food safety standards is not central because the
impact of trade barriers is reflected in a very
broad manner that does not account for safety
regulations.
Whether food safety standards operate predominantly as barriers or catalysts is largely
unresolved in the empirical work to date.
The analysis here estimates the magnitude of
import changes emerging from stricter food
safety standards in the form of mandatory
HACCP requirements and provides direct
tests of the hypotheses of “standards as barriers” versus “standards as catalysts” for developing country exports.
U.S. Seafood Trade, International Food
Safety, and HACCP
Although the United States is one of the
world’s largest exporters of seafood, its annual trade deficit in fishery products has been
rising to nearly $8 billion in the past fifteen
years (NMFS 2005b). Seafood from foreign
countries is filling a growing share of the U.S.
seafood market, which has grown over 50%
since 1980.
By 1998 imported seafood comprised 63%
of U.S. consumption. The share of imports
reached a peak of 76% of edible seafood consumption in 2002 (NMFS 2005b). Import volume has increased from 1997 to 2004 for both
developing and developed countries. Out of
the largest thirty-five seafood exporters that
supplied approximately 95% of the U.S. imports from 1996 to 2004, twenty-six are developing countries1 that account for 71% of edible
seafood imports (USDA/FAS 2004) and nine
1
Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Korea, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Russian
Federation, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Venezuela, and Viet Nam.

are developed countries.2 The net foreign exchange receipts derived from fish in developing countries increased from $11.6 billion in
1992 to $17.4 billion in 2002. In 2002, developing countries accounted for more than 49% of
the total worldwide value of seafood exports
(FAO 2004).
In 1997, a mandatory HACCP requirement
was adopted for the seafood industry in the
United States. We hypothesize that, all else
equal, the introduction of mandatory HACCP
had a negative effect on U.S. seafood imports.
If standards act as barriers for developing
country exporters, there should be a differential negative effect for these countries when
compared to developed countries. However, if
standards act as catalysts for developing countries as a group, we would expect no differential negative effect due to HACCP for these
countries. Alternatively, it may be that standards operate as a barrier or catalyst at the
country level independent of development status. In this case, we would expect to see differential effects on exports for countries based
on country characteristics such as the size of
the export industry and whether they already
had relatively high food safety standards, could
mobilize to meet HACCP requirements, or
had lower compliance costs. Further, we examine whether these effects differ in the short
run immediately after the new standards went
into effect versus the longer term.
The Panel Model Approach to Analysis
of HACCP Trade Impacts
Different methodological approaches have
been applied to disentangle the complicated
trade effects of food safety standards. Maskus,
Wilson, and Otsuki (2001) summarize alternative approaches to estimating the impact of
standards in general on trade. Previous studies by Swann, Temple, and Shurmer (1996),
van Beers and van den Bergh (1997), Peridy,
Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000), and Wilson
and Otsuki (2004) discuss the advantages of
econometric methods, especially the gravity
equation approach, for the analysis of standards in international trade.
Our model uses a variant of the classic gravity equation to analyze the effects of the U.S.
HACCP food safety standard on logarithms of
bilateral trade flows. The general gravity model

2
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.

is specified as
(1)
ln Importsitx
= 0 + 1 (Timet ) + 2 (HACCPit )
+ 3 ln(GDPt ) + 4 ln(Sizeit )
+ 5 ln(Exchangeit ) + 6 ln(Distancei )
+ 7 (MERCOSURi ) + 8 (NAFTAi )
+ 9 ln(ASEANi ) + 10 ln(APECi )
+ 11 ln(ANDEANi ) + 12 ln(GEOi ) + εi .
Table 1 presents definitions and descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. Importsxit denotes the imports
of seafood from country i to the United States
in a particular year t for the years 1990–2004
(NMFS 2005a, 2005b). Superscript x stands for
Q
either the volume of imports (Importsit ) or the
dollar value of imported seafood (Imports$it ).
The error ε i is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. Trade data for Korea
and Vietnam were incomplete and dropped,
yielding a panel data set of the thirty-three
leading exporters to the United States.
Time has the value one to fourteen for the
fourteen years of observations. HACCP reflects the implementation and enforcement of
HACCP requirements by FDA; it equals one
for 1998 to 2004 and zero in previous years.
Ideally, a more fine-grained policy variable
would be desirable that captures how effectively and quickly HACCP requirements were
put in place in different exporting countries
and how effective import inspection systems
were in determining compliance with HACCP.
However, data do not exist for such a variable. Here, GDP, as a proxy for U.S. seafood
demand, is the real per capita GDP of the
United States in 2000 U.S. dollars, and Size
is a proxy for the importance of international
seafood trade in each exporting country. It is
the sum of seafood imports and exports from
FAO’s database (FAO 2005).3 Alternatively,
“mass” is measured by Export, the value of
exports of total goods and services of each
country, Exchange is the market exchange rate
between the U.S. dollar and the domestic currency of each exporting country, and Distance
3
Using Size as a measure of an exporting country’s significance
in seafood trade with the United States, a common variable in gravity models, may cause endogeneity problems and potentially bias
HACCP estimates. The coefficient of correlation between Size and
the value (volume) of shipments to the United States from country
i is 0.34 (0.38). However, when we instrument for Size using Export, the instrumental variable model estimates of HACCP effects
were largely unchanged.

Table 1. Definitions of Variables and Sample Statistics
Variables
Importsxit
Imports$it

Variable Description

Mean

Dependent Variables
Annual volume of imported seafood into the United States by
42.77
country i (million metric tons)
Value of annual seafood imports into the United States by country 216.37
i (million U.S. dollars)

Standard
Deviation
66.57
343.70

Independent Variables
Trend 1990–2004
8.27
4.67
Introduction and enforcement of mandatory HACCP standards in
0.47
0.50
U.S. seafood (1998–2004 = 1)
GDPt
Real per capita U.S. GDP (1,000 U.S. $)
29.53
7.01
Sizeit
Total annual volume of seafood imports and exports of country i
143.16
1.51
(million metric tons)
Exportit
Annual export value of total goods and services of country i
60.58
95.05
(billion U.S. $)
Exchangeit
Real exchange rate between U.S. $ and domestic currency i (value 697.50 2,706.34
of one dollar in terms of domestic currency i)
Distancei
Geographical distance between country i and the United States
4.92
2.97
(thousand miles)
MERCOSURi Dummy variable for MERCOSUR member countries: Argentina,
0.06
0.24
Brazil
NAFTAi
Dummy variable for NAFTA members countries: Mexico, Canada
0.04
0.21
ASEAN i
Dummy variable for ASEAN member countries: Indonesia,
0.12
0.32
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
APECi
Dummy variable for APEC member countries: Australia, Canada,
0.37
0.48
Chile, China, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand
ANDEAN i
Dummy variable for ANDEAN member countries: Colombia,
0.12
0.32
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
Geoi
Geographical connection between fishery exporting countries
1.76
0.73
(South America = 1; Australasia = 2; Europe and Canada = 3)
Timet
HACCPt

is the geographical measure of distance from
the United States.
Five variables account for membership
in regional trade agreements: MERCOSUR,
NAFTA, ASEAN, APEC, and ANDEAN;
they equal one in years when the agreement
was in force in country i and zero otherwise.
Also, Geo is a classification variable, indicating geographical connection between seafood
exporters and the United States that may involve historic ties. As we could not identify
clear colonial ties for the United States, this
variable has three groups of geographically homogeneous countries controlling for the omitted variable problem of country ties in trade
flow analysis: South American countries are
captured in Geo1, Australasian countries are
included in Geo2, and European countries and
Canada are in Geo3. South Africa is the only
African seafood exporting country in the data
set; it is included in the Australasian country
group.

Regarding the signs of the first derivatives
of the independent variables, we hypothesize
that, all else equal, adoption of the HACCP
standard has had a negative impact on U.S.
seafood imports, while increases in U.S. GDP
have had a positive impact. The size of the exporting country’s economy (Size or Export) is
hypothesized to have a positive impact, while
the foreign exchange rate to the U.S. Dollar
(Exchange) is expected to show a negative sign.
The impact of geographical Distance is hypothesized to be negative. All other signs are ambiguous; there are different hypotheses on the
influence of time, trade agreements, and geographical connection.
Empirical Analysis of HACCP Effects
on Seafood Imports
The panel of fishery product import data is estimated across thirty-three exporting countries

for the time period 1990–2004 using alternative model specifications based on the general
gravity model in equation (1). Model 1 is the
benchmark specification of the gravity equation. It controls for the impact of mandatory
HACCP requirements for seafood on trade
flows into the United States. Other included
variables are a time trend (Time), a proxy for
U.S. seafood demand (GDP), the size of the
exporting country’s seafood sector (Size), exchange rate (Exchange), and geographical distance (Distance):
(2)
ln Importsitx
= 0 + 1 (Timet ) + 2 (HACCPit )
+ 3 ln(GDPt ) + 3 ln(Sizeit )
+ 5 ln(Exchangeit )
+ 6 ln(Distancei ) + εi .
Model 2 adds variables for regional trade
agreements (MERCOSUR, NAFTA, ASEAN,
APEC, and ANDEAN) allowing for tests
of whether these agreements have significant
effects on seafood imports into the United
States:
(3)
ln Importsitx
= 0 + 1 (Timet ) + 2 (HACCPit )
+ 3 ln(G D Pt ) + 4 ln(Si zeit )
+ 5 ln(Exchangeit ) + 6 ln(Distancei )
+ 7 (MERCOSURi ) + 8 (NAFTAi )
+ 9 (ASEANi ) + 10 (APECi )
+ 11 (ANDEANi ) + εi .
Model 3 introduces alternative specifications for two types of variables in order to
test the robustness of the results. The value
of a country’s total export of goods and services (Export) is used as an alternative to
test whether the size of an exporting country had a differential effect on seafood trade
with the United States. The variables Geo1 and
Geo2 are used as an alternative specification
of country-group-specific effects on seafood
trade previously represented by the regional
trade agreement variables:

(4)
ln Importsitx
= 0 + 1 (Timet ) + 2 (HACCPit )
+ 3 ln(GDPt ) + 4 ln(Exportit )
+ 5 ln(Exchangeit ) + 6 ln(Distancei )
+ 7 (Geo1i ) + 8 (Geo2i ) + εi .
The panel nature of the data may introduce heterogeneity biases requiring appropriate econometric methods to separate
time-series and cross-sectional effects. Initial
ordinary least squares (OLS) panel estimates
revealed significant first-order serial correlation. We therefore apply exact maximum likelihood estimators (ExactML). The parameter
estimates are corrected for first-order serial
correlation of the residuals, and stationarity
of the time-series properties is imposed (Beach
and MacKinnon 1978). Given the large number of country-pair relations in the data set
taken from a larger population, we treat
the corresponding country effects as random.
However, Hausman test results are reported
with each regression model.
The choice of the estimation procedure
is motivated by different factors. First,
fixed-effect models are inappropriate when
time- and product-invariant variables such as
geographical distance are included, because
fixed-effects estimators eliminate all timeinvariant variation (Peridy, Guillotreau, and
Bernard 2000; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004).
Consequently, random-effects estimators are
more appropriate given the importance of the
distance variable for trade flow analysis. There
are good reasons for arguing that countryspecific fixed effects come to the fore especially
when stricter food standards may boost or
hamper trade flows across countries. Of course,
such factors are deterministically linked with
individual country specifics, which may not
be considered as random. While Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001), Wilson and Otsuki
(2004), and Blind and Jungmittag (2005) apply
fixed-effects models, Egger and Pfaffermayr
(2004) and Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard
(2000), among others, doubt the appropriateness of such models in trade flow analysis.
This is especially the case, when time-invariant
geographical distance variables are included in
gravity equations, which is the most prominent
example.

Table 2. Gravity Model Random-Effects Estimates of HACCP Impacts on U.S. Seafood
Imports, 1990–2004a
Dollar Value of Imported Seafood

Time
HACCP
GDP
Size

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

0.041∗∗∗
(4.43)
−0.598∗∗∗
(−5.71)
0.622∗∗∗
(17.68)
0.406∗∗∗
(11.16)

0.043∗∗∗
(4.96)
−0.408∗∗∗
(−4.08)
0.442∗∗∗
(11.04)
0.255∗∗∗
(6.59)

0.019∗
(1.94)
−0.036
(−0.34)
0.101∗∗∗
(3.57)

0.030∗∗∗
(2.60)
−0.420∗∗∗
(−3.29)
0.528∗∗∗
(12.62)
0.426∗∗∗
(9.76)

0.040∗∗∗
(3.89)
−0.331∗∗∗
(−2.84)
0.353∗∗∗
(7.62)
0.261∗∗∗
(5.73)

−0.013
(−0.62)
−0.212∗∗
(−2.48)

−0.019
(−0.71)
−0.010
(−0.08)
1.41∗∗∗
(4.09)
0.685∗∗∗
(3.56)
0.793∗∗∗
(4.39)
0.502∗∗
(2.21)

0.007
(0.28)
−0.110
(−1.10)

−0.003
(−0.08)
−0.246∗
(−1.90)
0.459∗∗∗
(2.35)
0.816∗∗∗
(3.68)
1.35∗∗∗
(6.47)
0.331
(1.28)

Export
Exchange
Distance
NAFTA
ASEAN
APEC
ANDEAN

0.324∗∗∗
(7.33)
0.043
(1.64)
−0.684∗∗∗
(−5.24)

GEO1
GEO2
Rho 
DW
Hausman
Adj. R2
No.
Fb

Volume of Imported Seafood

0.84
1.71
0.60
0.77
492
10.97

0.85
1.63
4.73
0.79
492
16.73

1.082∗∗∗
(4.56)
0.015
(0.07)
0.85
1.67
0.96
0.76
492
24.15

0.79
1.74
0.15
0.74
492
17.25

0.83
1.76
0.87
0.78
492
15.98

Model 3
0.008
(0.80)
−0.020
(−0.17)
0.022
(0.77)
0.275∗∗∗
(5.76)
0.073∗∗
(2.52)
−0.719∗∗∗
(−4.83)

1.557∗∗∗
(5.74)
0.066
(0.30)
0.82
1.74
0.14
0.72
492
23.82

Note: Single asterisk (∗ ), double asterisks (∗∗ ), and triple asterisks (∗∗∗ ) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
a Random-effect estimates corrected for first-order serial autocorrelation. The t-statistics (in parentheses) computed with White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors.
b Critical F value computed according to Leamer (1994, p. 114).

Overall Effects of HACCP Implementation
Table 2 presents estimation results for Models 1–3 in two groups. The first uses dollar
value of imported seafood as the dependent
variable, while the second uses the volume
of imported seafood. The random-effects estimates of the gravity models are generally
well behaved. Double-logarithmic specifications generated the best parameter estimates
in all models and allow for the direct interpretation of coefficient elasticities. Statistically
significant F-tests reject the null hypothesis of
equivalence of OLS and fixed-effects models
at the 95% level. Fixed-effects models were

largely outperformed by random-effects models as indicated by the Hausman tests.4
The results presented in table 2 support
the hypothesis that, all else equal, mandatory HACCP implementation had an overall negative and significant effect on seafood
imports into the United States. The elasticities of HACCP effects across model specifications are calculated from the estimated
model coefficients for this dummy variable
4
The estimation of fixed-effects models revealed parameters
values of similar magnitudes. These results are presented in table S1 of the supporting Appendix (Anders and Caswell 2008) to
this article.

using the procedure proposed by Halvorsen
and Palmquist (1980) in order to produce a theoretically consistent interpretation of the estimated magnitudes. HACCP elasticities range
from −0.03% to −0.59% with respect to the
value of imported seafood products. This effect
translates to an average marginal annual loss
in trade value of $2.6 and $51.7 million, respectively. The HACCP effect on import volumes
was up to −0.42% or an average marginal decrease of 9,537 metric tons. Thus for importers
as a whole, HACCP posed a significant barrier to selling into the U.S. market. In comparison, the gravity equation panel model of
Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000) shows
a significantly negative but rather marginal
(−0.092) impact of trade barriers on aggregate seafood imports into France from 1988 to
1994.
The benchmark Model 1 and alternative
Models 2 and 3 support a positive time trend in
seafood imports into the United States with respect to both values and quantities of seafood.
This underscores an important point that overall imports were increasing; the marginal impact of HACCP was to dampen this trend. Real
GDP per capita, as a proxy for U.S. per capita
demand, is positively related to seafood imports. Our results indicate that a 1% increase
in U.S. per capita GDP led to a 0.62% increase
in the value of seafood imports. The volume
effect on seafood imports, with an increase of
up to 0.53%, is of similar magnitude.
The geographical distance variable shows
the hypothesized negative effect on seafood
trade in all model specifications with the exception of Model 2 for the dollar value of imports. The elasticity estimates indicate trade
effects from increasing transport and transaction costs. However, the magnitudes of these
distance effects tend to be lower than those of
Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000) who
report a significant distance elasticity of −0.74
for seafood imports into France.
The panel regressions also highlight the significance of the “mass” variable (Size) as a major factor in explaining trade flows. The importance of each country’s seafood sector, in terms
of the total value of fishery trade, has a significant and positive effect on its ability to penetrate the U.S. market. This trade facilitating
effect is confirmed in the alternative specifications for the dollar value of total exports in
goods and services (Export) as a proxy of country i’s export orientation. A 1% increase in a
country’s value of total exports is associated

with an increase of seafood exports (value and
volume) of around 0.3%.
The effect on seafood imports of the foreign
exchange rate to the U.S. dollar is inconclusive
across model specifications. This contrasts with
a theoretically plausible and significant positive exchange rate elasticity of 0.97 reported
by Martı́nez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann
(2004) for seafood exports by MERCOSUR
countries. Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard
(2000) report a nominal exchange rate elasticity of −0.54.
To the best of our knowledge, this study
is the first to explore the effects of regional
trade agreements and geographical connections among countries on seafood trade flows.
The results of Model 2 show significant positive
effects of relevant trade agreements for both
dependent variables. NAFTA has the greatest
positive impact of 1.4% on the value of U.S.
seafood imports, while exports of APEC members are about 1.3% higher in terms of volumes.5
Model 3, which includes the impact of
geographical connections, shows that South
American countries (Geo1) have better access
overall to the U.S. seafood market compared
to the residual group of European countries
and Canada. Their export advantage is 1.1% in
value of product and 1.6% in export volume.
In contrast, the group of Australasian countries (Geo2) has no significant competitive advantage compared to European countries and
Canada.
Developing and Developed Country Effects
of HACCP Implementation
To specifically address the “standards as barriers” versus “standards as catalysts” views, we
test for differential HACCP effects between
developing and developed countries with separate panel regressions of the benchmark
Model 1. The model allows a focus on the differential impact of HACCP on country groups
and countries, while accounting for other major factors that affect seafood trade with the
United States.
The “standards as barriers” view hypothesizes a differential negative effect of HACCP
adoption for developing countries. In contrast,
developed countries, which largely account
5
Due to insignificant results, the variable MERCOSUR was
dropped from Model 2 for both specifications of the independent
variable.

Table 3. Overall Short- and Long-Run Elasticities of HACCP Effects for All, Developing, and
Developed Countriesa
Estimates of HACCP Elasticities
1990–2004
(long run)

1990–99
(short run)

Dollar value of U.S.
Seafood imports
Volume of U.S.
Seafood imports
Dollar value of U.S.
Seafood imports
Volume of U.S.
Seafood imports

All Countries

Developing Countries

−0.598∗∗∗
(−5.71)
−0.420∗∗∗
(−3.29)
−0.710∗∗∗
(−6.13)
−0.604∗∗∗
(−4.41)

−0.748∗∗∗
(−6.62)
−0.662∗∗∗
(−5.25)
−0.740∗∗∗
(−5.99)
−0.694∗∗∗
(−4.59)

Developed Countries
0.212
(1.36)
0.436∗∗
(2.46)
0.227
(1.55)
0.462∗∗∗
(2.62)

Note: Single asterisk (∗ ), double asterisks (∗∗ ), and triple asterisks (∗∗∗ ) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
a ExactML random-effect estimates of HACCP elasticities based on Model 1 for 1990–2004 (the long run) and 1990–99 (the short run) subsamples of the panel
data set. Results are corrected for first-order serial correlation. The t-statistics (in parentheses) computed using White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors.

for the enforcement of enhanced food quality and safety standards, may experience a less
negative or a positive effect of HACCP introduction on exports to the United States. Industrialized countries are assumed to have the
resources to adapt more quickly to increases
in standards. Moreover, a negative effect on
exports from developing countries in the postHACCP period may allow developed countries to add market share in seafood trade with
the United States.
The estimates of HACCP elasticities for U.S.
seafood imports for the entire period of 1990–
2004 (referred to as the long run) from all,
developing, and developed countries are reported in the upper panel of table 3. As discussed above, HACCP implementation had
a significantly negative effect on trade flows
across all exporting countries when measured
over the entire long-run time period from 1990
to 2004 and with controls for other determinants of seafood trade such as time, U.S. GDP,
distance, and export orientation. Similarly, the
point elasticities of the HACCP trade flow effects for developing countries are consistently
negative and significant over this period. They
exceed the overall negative HACCP impact
levels for all countries. Developing countries’
relative marginal loss in seafood trade with
the United States is −0.75% of export value,
while the marginal effect on export volumes is
−0.66%. This translates to an average marginal
annual loss in export value of $46.1 million
and an average marginal loss in volume of
8,026 metric tons. In contrast, the effect for
developed countries is positive but not statistically significant for the dollar value of imports and positive and significant in terms of

volume of seafood imports, where the marginal
effect is 0.44% or equivalently 1,972 metric
tons.
Comparing results, Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) forecast a negative impact of
stricter standards on exports to the EU from
developing countries in Africa. Their elasticity
estimate predicted that tighter standards for
Aflatoxin B1 in the EU would result in significant negative trade flow effects for imports of
fruits, nuts, and vegetables from African countries. Jaffe and Henson (2004) later concluded
that the effects were negative but not as large
as predicted. Wilson and Otsuki (2004) also
predicted a significant negative effect on imports from the introduction by the EU of a
new pesticide standard for bananas. Our results over the entire period 1990–2004 using a
classification of exporting countries as developing or developed provide an ex post analysis
that supports the finding that enhanced food
safety standards in developed countries can act
as barriers resulting in significant reductions in
exports from developing countries.
For countries with limited investment resources, it could be argued that the successful
adoption of food safety standards is a matter
of time. For example, Donovan, Caswell, and
Salay (2001) report a transition period of two
months up to five years for the implementation and full compliance with HACCP standards in the Brazilian fish processing industry.
As a consequence, countries that are immediately in compliance may expand their market
shares at the expense of those who are not—at
least in the short run.
To explore differential effects over time,
we compare HACCP elasticities estimated

over the entire longer-run period 1990–2004,
which includes seven years under the HACCP
requirement (shown in the upper panel of
table 3), to those over the shorter-run period 1990–99 (shown in the lower panel of
table 3), which includes the first two years
of the HACCP requirement. The results reveal significant differences in the magnitude
of HACCP effects between the long and
short run. For all countries, the short-run
HACCP elasticities are of greater magnitude
for both the dollar value and volume of seafood
imports. The overall long-term pattern of a
negative HACCP effect on developing and a
positive effect on developed countries holds
in the short term as well. Moreover, the results do not show that the negative effect for
developing countries began to be mitigated
in the longer run; the HACPP effects for the
two periods do not show a significant difference. Overall, the results based on comparisons of developing versus developed countries
as groups support the hypothesis of “standards
as barriers.”
Country-Specific Effects of HACCP
Implementation
While the previous results support the “standards as barriers” hypothesis, these results
may mask differences in country-level effects
within the developing and developed country
groups. To explore possible differences, we estimated mixed linear panel models (Verbeke
and Molenberghs 1997) that merge a vector
of unknown fixed effects and a vector of unknown random effects, thus allowing for a
simultaneous disclosure of random- and fixedeffect properties of the panel data variables.
In the underlying theoretical mixed-linear
model, the dependent variable y denotes the
vector of observed yi s. On the right-hand side,
X is the known matrix of xij s, i s represent
the unknown fixed-effects parameter vector,
Z is the known matrix of zi s, and  is a vector of unknown random-effects parameters
(De Leeuw 2005). The country-level effects
of HACCP requirements were estimated using the benchmark Model 1 with fixed HACCP
effects for the thirty-three countries exporting
to the United States. Table 4 shows countrylevel pre-HACCP seafood imports and estimates of the short-run (1990–99) and long-run
(1990–2004) total trade flow effects of HACCP
when other major determinants of seafood
trade are controlled for. These effects are heterogeneous among developing and developed

countries, and in some cases in the short versus
the long run.
A surprisingly clear pattern of individual
country trade responses emerges based on the
pre-HACCP size of the country’s seafood exports to the United States. The larger exporters
gained from the introduction of stricter food
safety regulations. Twelve of the top fifteen
suppliers of seafood to the United States had
strictly positive trade flow effects in the short
and long run post-HACCP periods. In contrast,
ten of the eighteen smaller exporters experienced negative short- and long-run HACCP
effects, while an additional four experienced a
negative long-term effect. Developing and developed countries are both fully represented
among the large and small exporters, and thus
among the marginal gainers and losers, in the
post-HACCP adoption period.
Comparison of short- and long-term effects
at the country level underscores that the aggregate analysis showing developing countries
losing and developed countries gaining relatively under HACCP may be misleading.
Among the twenty-four developing countries
that were in the top thirty-three exporters to
the United States, ten showed long-term gains
and fourteen showed losses under HACCP,
all else equal. Marginal gainers are concentrated among large exporters and losers among
small exporters. Among these smaller exporters, the magnitudes of negative trade flow
effects across developing countries range from
−$6.9 to −$44.8 million based on the 1997 preHACCP export values of seafood products.
Meanwhile, among the nine developed countries six showed gains and three losses in the
long run.
While the HACCP effect for developed
countries was predominantly positive, developing countries had a mixed experience.
Considered on a country level, neither the
“standards as barriers” or “standards as catalysts” hypothesis fits developing countries as a
whole. Instead, the data suggest that among developing countries increased standards act as a
catalyst for larger, more established exporting
countries and a barrier for smaller exporters.
To our knowledge, this analysis is the first to
present estimates of the country-specific impacts of stricter food safety standards across a
broad panel of bilateral trade relations with the
United States. Analyzing trade effects at a disaggregate, country level provides valuable information on the impacts of stricter food safety
regulations that is not available from a more
aggregate analysis.

Table 4. Magnitudes of Country-Specific HACCP Effects on U.S. Seafood Salesa
Pre- HACCP Imports
to the United States
(1997)
Country
Canada
Thailand
Ecuador
Mexico
China
Chile
Indonesia
Russia
Japan
Taiwan
Iceland
India
Philippines
Bangladesh
New Zealand
Norway
Panama
Venezuela
Honduras
Argentina
Singapore
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
Brazil
Peru
Australia
Bahamas
Colombia
South Africa
Trinidad and
Tobago
Guyana
United
Kingdom
Denmark

Short Runb
(1998–99)

Long Runc
(1998–2004)

HACCP Impact
HACCP Impact
(U.S.$ million) Change (%) (U.S. $ million) Change (%)

Rank

(U.S. $ million)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

1,305.92
1,166.99
714.87
492.19
321.19
316.74
251.10
230.12
203.88
187.34
184.30
170.86
139.84
134.32
133.22
125.50
112.99
99.70
99.39
88.79
75.16
73.60
71.39
69.58
65.77
53.95
39.30
37.02
31.06
29.02

383.1
357.27
126.12
113.49
42.67
76.64
46.14
−61.53
29.48
−26.36
27.71
34.34
36.23
−19.83
17.71
−38.60
−13.11
−12.89
14.68
0.04
−3.81
0.51
−10.87
1.46
−22.01
5.37
−2.85
−9.11
3.77
2.94

+29.3
+30.6
+17.6
+23.1
+13.3
+24.2
+18.4
−26.7
+14.5
−14.1
+15.0
+20.1
+25.9
−14.8
+13.3
−30.8
−11.6
−12.9
+14.8
+0.05
−5.1
+0.7
−15.2
+2.1
−33.7
+9.9
−7.1
−24.6
+12.1
+10.1

511.47
433.95
131.85
72.66
159.80
231.73
160.81
−31.47
41.32
−15.04
15.09
89.15
59.93
−43.09
53.79
−81.13
−18.28
−28.33
3.11
−12.81
−24.46
−6.86
−7.79
33.09
−44.76
42.80
−13.90
−14.39
−13.21
−13.22

+39.2
+37.2
+18.4
+14.8
+49.7
+73.2
+64.0
−13.7
+20.3
−8.0
+0.8
+52.2
+42.9
−32.1
+40.4
−64.4
−16.2
−28.4
+0.3
−14.4
−32.5
−9.3
−10.9
+47.6
−68.1
+99.4
−34.8
−38.9
−42.5
−45.6

31
32

28.20
19.50

−2.16
−2.92

−7.7
−14.9

−10.61
+4.95

−37.6
+25.4

33

17.53

−5.5

−29.7

−8.48

−48.4

a Results

are obtained through ExactML pooled panel regressions corrected for serial correlation. The t-statistics (in parentheses) computed with White’s
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
b Calculations based on pooled panel regression of benchmark Model 1 for value of seafood imports, n = 330.
c Calculation of HACCP effects based on pooled panel regressions of Model 1a, n = 495.

Conclusions
Food-borne safety risks associated with domestic and imported seafood products motivated the introduction of mandatory HACCP
for seafood products in the United States in
1997. From the point of view of the United
States and other developed countries, regulatory standards such as this are intended to reduce potential risks. However, they can also
create nontariff trade barriers and significant

trade redirections. The conventional wisdom is
that increased food safety standards in developed countries amount to “standards as barriers,” particularly for developing countries. An
alternative view sees the potential for “standards as catalysts,” as developing countries react to new standards with increased investment
in quality assurance.
This article contributes to this discussion by
estimating the trade impact of the 1997 introduction of HACCP in the United States

for domestic and imported seafood products.
We apply panel data on seafood imports to
the United States by the thirty-three largest
exporting countries between 1990 and 2004.
Twenty-four of these countries are developing,
while nine are developed. The results of extended gravity models indicate a significantly
negative impact of the HACCP standard on
U.S. seafood imports across all thirty-three
exporting countries, dampening the overall
growth of these imports. The results are robust in terms of effect on product values and
trade volumes. Comparison of trade effects for
developing versus developed countries at an
aggregate level supports the “standards as barriers” hypothesis. While developing countries
as a group suffered a negative trade effect under HACCP, developed countries, again as a
group, gained under HACCP.
A different picture emerges, however, based
on estimates of country-specific HACCP impacts. These reveal considerable differences
across countries with regard to the pattern
of short- and long-run post-HACCP trade
flow effects. A clear majority of the larger
seafood exporting countries gained increasing trade with the United States, all else
equal, in the post-HACCP period. In contrast,
most smaller exporters experienced short- and
long-run negative trade effects after the U.S.
HACCP standard was adopted. Developing
countries were among both groups, suggesting
that “standards as catalysts” applies to larger,
more established exporters among developing countries and “standards as barriers” to
smaller exporters.
Overall, the results emphasize the importance of more detailed quantitative economic
modeling at the standard, market, product, and
country levels to inform the discussion of the
role of food safety standards as nontariff barriers in international trade, especially for developing countries. Economic analysis of the
trade effects of increased food safety measures
can be useful in the development of more effective food safety systems, in particular by
developed countries. Such analysis can also
support measurement of the welfare effects of
food safety standards for individual developing countries.
[Received May 2007;
accepted August 2008.]
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